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* * * 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1 of appeals appi) in >i *i!«v f^iil UwlapJ ii 'jamming ihc 
\ carch and thereby err in reversing the order of the trial court denying 
defendant's motion to suppress? 
2 In examining the trial court's determination that defendant's consent to search 
came in the course of a consensual encounter, did the court of appeals fail to accord the trial 
coir leasure of discretion in mis iippln;*i(niii i I itr 1 mirth "l| mnnlmenl itariiUnl to iihr 
facts? 
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Standard of Review. On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the 
court of appeals for correctness. State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, J 9, 22 P.3d 1242, 'The 
correctness of the court of appeals' decision turns on whether that court accurately reviewed 
the trial court's decision under the appropriate standard of review." Id. The trial court's 
factual findings underlying its decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence are 
reviewed for clear error. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,939 n.4 (Utah 1994); accord State v. 
Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 8, 6 P.3d 1133. The trial court's conclusions of law based on those 
findings are reviewed for correctness, 44with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's 
application of the legal standard to the facts." Pena, 869 P.2d at 936-39; accord Veteto, 2000 
UT62,atf 8. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
Application of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied 
to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, is determinative of the appeal. The Fourth 
Amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, and unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B 
misdemeanor. R. 02. A warrant was issued for defendant's arrest when he failed to appear 
for the preliminary hearing. R. 12-13. A week later, defendant was arrested and booked into 
jail. R. 16. Following a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over for trial 
on both counts. R. 20. Thereafter, defendant moved to suppress the evidence obtained by 
police from a search of his vehicle. R. 23-24. Following an evidentiary hearing, the trial 
court denied defendant's motion. R. 51,63-69, 84. 
Defendant subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty to unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance and the misdemeanor charge was dismissed. R. 52,55-62; R. 85: 
5,15-16. In entering his plea, defendant reserved his right to appeal the adverse ruling on 
his motion to suppress. R. 55, 58; R- 85: 16. The trial court sentenced defendant to an 
indeterminate prison term of zero-to- five years, but suspended imposition of the prison term 
and placed defendant on supervised probation. R. 70-72; R. 86: 9-10. 
After sentencing, defendant timely appealed the trial court's ruling on the motion to 
suppress. R. 74. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling, concluding that 
defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search and that the traffic stop never de-escalated 
to a consensual encounter. State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353,17 P.3d 1135. This Court 
granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari review. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
While on patrol in the late evening of December 11,1998, Officer Bruce Huntington 
observed a car traveling southbound on Holden Street in Midvale. R. 84: 7-8. Defendant 
was driving the vehicle and another male was sitting in the front passenger seat. R. 84: 12. 
Officer Huntington initiated a computer check of defendant's license plate with the database 
for the Utah Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). R. 84:7,10. While Officer Huntington 
awaited the results, defendant made an unlawful left turn onto Main Street. R. 84: 7-10. 
Within moments, the computer check revealed that defendant's car was not insured, 
whereupon Officer Huntington activated his overhead emergency lights to initiate a traffic 
stop. R. 84:7,10-11. 
Defendant turned into the parking lot of a convenience store and Officer Huntington 
pulled in behind him. R. 84: 7, 11, 14. Officer Huntington approached defendant and 
advised him of the purpose of the stop. R. 84:12. Defendant gave the officer his driver's 
license and registration, but admitted that he had no insurance. R. 84:12-13. With license 
and registration in hand, Officer Huntington returned to his patrol car to check on the status 
of defendant's license and to perform a warrants check. R. 84:13,29. Approximately five 
minutes later, the computer revealed a valid driver's license and no outstanding warrants. 
R. 84: 13. Officer Huntington promptly returned to defendant's car after receiving this 
information to discuss the violations. R. 84: 13-14. As Officer Huntington spoke with 
defendant, a second officer pulled into the parking lot, parking along side Officer 
Huntington's car. R. 84: 14-15. The second officer did not approach defendant's car, but 
4 
instead walked to the passenger door of Officer Huntington's car where he remained while 
Officer Huntington spoke with defendant. R. 84: 15-16. 
Upon returning to defendant's car, Officer Huntington instructed defendant to obtain 
insurance and to advise his insurance agent to notify DMV. R. 84: 16-17,35,43-44. After 
so warning defendant, Officer Huntington returned defendant's license and registration. R. 
84: 16-17, 29. Although defendant was then fiee to leave, Officer Huntington asked 
defendant if he had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the car. R. 84:17-18. When defendant 
told him that he did not, Officer Huntington asked for and obtained defendant's consent to 
search the car. R. 84:17-18. In seeking consent to search, Officer Huntington used a normal 
tone of voice and did not make any promises or threats. R. 84: 18. Although Officer 
Huntington was armed with a firearm, he did not pull it out during the stop or subsequent 
search. R. 84: 19. 
After defendant consented to the search, he and his passenger exited the car. R. 84: 
18-19. When defendant opened the door, Officer Huntington observed a "billy club" on the 
floorboard next to the driver's door. R. 84: 20,41. Officer Huntington performed a pat-
down search of defendant for weapons, but found none. R. 84: 23, 41. At Officer 
Huntington's request, defendant walked to the patrol car where the second officer was 
standing while Officer Huntington searched the car. R. 84:19-20. A search of defendant's 
car revealed a marijuana pipe on the floorboard in the driver's area. R. 84: 20-21. When 
questioned about the marijuana pipe, defendant told Officer Huntington that it belonged to 
him. R. 84: 20-21. Officer Huntington then arrested defendant, placing him in handcuffs. 
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R. 84: 22. Officer Huntington searched defendant incident to his arrest and found 
methamphetamine in his pocket. R. 56; R. 84: 22; R. 85:10-11. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The court of appeals erred in applying a three-part analysis in assessing the validity 
of the consent search. The three-part standard, which imposes a presumption against the 
waiver of one's right to be free from an otherwise unlawful search, is in direct conflict with 
the Supreme Court's "totality of the circumstances" test. In employing the erroneous 
standard, the court of appeals imposed an evidentiary burden on the State at a suppression 
hearing that is neither reasonable, nor required under this Court's precedents. The court of 
appeals' application of the standard resulted not only in the erroneous finding that defendant 
did not consent to the search, but also in the erroneous legal determination that any consent 
given was not voluntary. 
The court of appeals also failed to accord the trial court with an appropriate measure 
of discretion in its application of the Fourth Amendment standard governing seizures to the 
facts of this case. Once the officer warned defendant to obtain insurance and returned 
defendant's driver's license and registration, a reasonable person would believe that he was 
free to leave. The ensuing questions that resulted in defendant's consent to search were 
asked in the course of a consensual encounter. Accordingly, contrary to the court of appeals' 
determination, the trial court correctly concluded that defendant's consent to search was not 
the product of a prior illegality. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLIED THE WRONG FOURTH 
AMENDMENT STANDARD FOR DETERMINING THE VALIDITY OF A 
CONSENT SEARCH, RESULTING IN AN ERRONEOUS DECISION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "[t]he right 
of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and [that] no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause " U.S. Const, amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment thus adopts a "strong 
preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331 (1983). "[Searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,357,88 S.Ct. 507,514 (1967) (footnote omitted); accord 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684,688 (Utah 1990). 
One such exception to the warrant requirement is a search conducted pursuant to 
consent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,219,93 S.Ct 2041,2043-44 (1973). A 
consent to search operates as a waiver of one's "right to be free from an otherwise unlawful 
search." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,256,111 S.Ct 1801,1806 (1991) (Marshall, J„ 
dissenting). Consent may not be coerced, but must be freely and voluntarily given. 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222,93 S.Ct. at 2045; accord Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. The State 
7 
bears the burden of establishing that the consent was voluntary. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
222, 93 S.Ct at 2045; accord Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
On appeal, the court of appeals applied the following "presumption against waiver" 
analysis in determining the validity of a consent search: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
"unequivocal and specific" and "freely and intelligently given"; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived. 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at 118 (quoting State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433,439 (Utah App. 
1996)). The appellate court's use of that standard is contrary to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence and resulted not only in the erroneous finding that defendant did not consent 
to the search, but also in the erroneous legal conclusion that any consent given was not 
voluntary. 
A. HISTORY OF THE "PRESUMPTION AGAINST WAIVER" STANDARD. 
1. The Tenth Circuit Adopts a "Presumption Against Waiver" Standard: 
VUlano v. United States, 
The three-part standard articulated in Hansen originated from the 1962 decision of the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in VUlano v. United States, 310 F.2d 680 (10th Cir. 1962). 
Quoting a Third Circuit decision, the Tenth Circuit summarized the standard for determining 
the validity of a consent search as follows: 
"The government must prove that consent was given. It must show that there 
was no duress or coercion, express or implied. The consent must be 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'. There must be 
8 
convincing evidence that defendant has waived his rights- There must be clear 
and positive testimony- '"Courts indulge every reasonable presumption 
against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights.'" 
Villano, 310 F.2d at 684 {United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81,83-84 (3rd Cir. 1962) (citations 
omitted)). 
Underlying the Villano standard was the court's view that "4[c]oercion is implicit in 
situations where consent is obtained under color of the badge '" Id {quoting Page, 310 
F.2d at 84). The court explained that "the initial determination of a fact which nullifies a 
constitutional right, and the appellate acceptance of such finding, should be approached with 
caution, and with full cognizance of the many limiting rules which recognize the 
unlikelihood of the waiver of a basic personal right." Id. The Tenth Circuit thus directed 
courts to "indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of one's right to be free 
from an otherwise unlawful search. Id. To overcome that presumption, the Tenth Circuit 
required the government to prove, by "clear and positive testimony," that the consent was not 
only "voluntarily" given, but also that it was "intelligently given." Id. 
2. The U.S. Supreme Court Adopts a "Totality of the Circumstances" Test: 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 
Eleven years later, the United States Supreme Court rejected the rationale underlying 
the Villano decision. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,221-22,93 S.Ct. 2041, 
2045 (1973), the Supreme Court addressed whether a valid consent search required the state 
to demonstrate that the consent "had been given with an understanding that it could be freely 
and effectively withheld." The Supreme Court concluded that it did not, relying on the 
9 
plethora of decisions addressing the voluntariness of a defendant's confession under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Confession Cases. The Supreme Court noted that its cases addressing the 
voluntariness of a confession '^ yidd no talismanic definition of 'voluntariness.'" Id. at 224, 
93 S.Ct. at 2046. 
Rather, 'voluntariness' has reflected an accommodation of the complex 
of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect. At one end of the 
spectrum is the acknowledged need for police questioning as a tool for the 
effective enforcement of criminal laws At the other end of the spectrum 
is the test of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal law 
cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness, and that the possibility of unfair 
and even brutal police tactics poses a real and serious threat to civilized 
notions of justice. 
Id. at 224-25, 93 S.Ct at 2046. The court observed that its decisions "reflect a frank 
recognition that the Constitution requires the sacrifice of neither security nor liberty." Id. at 
225,93 S.Ct. at 2047. According to the court, "4[t]he ultimate test remains that which has 
been the only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for two hundred years: the 
test of voluntariness. Is the confession the product of an essentially free and unconstrained 
choice by its maker?" Id. (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court observed that "[i]n determining whether a defendant's will was 
overborne in a particular case, [it] has assessed the totality of all the surrounding 
circumstances—both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation." 
Id. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. The court noted that none of [its decisions] turned on the 
10 
presence or absence of a single controlling criterion; each reflected a careful scrutiny of all 
the surrounding circumstances." Id. 
Consent Searches. After surveying the law regarding confessions, the Supreme Court 
found "no reason... to depart in the area of consent searches, from the traditional definition 
of 'voluntariness'" for confessions under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 229,93 S.Ct. 
at 2049. "Just as was true with confessions, the requirement of a 'voluntary' consent reflects 
a fair accommodation of the constitutional requirements involved." Id. at 229,93 S.Ct. at 
2048-49. Thus, as with a confession, "the question whether a consent to a search was in fact 
'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact 
to be determined from the totality of the circumstances." Id. at 227,93 S.Ct. at 2047-48. The 
court held that in making that assessment, "account must be taken of subtly coercive police 
questions, as well as the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person who consents." 
Mat 229,93 S.Ct at 2049. 
The Supreme Court declined to adopt a Miranda-like requirement mandating that 
police, before seeking consent to search, advise detainees that they have the right to refuse 
consent.1 The Court held that "knowledge of a right to refuse is not a prerequisite of a 
voluntary consent" Id. at 231-32,234,93 S.Ct. at 2049-51 (emphasis added). The Court 
explained that "[a]lmost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent 
waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal 
lMiranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966), established notification 
requirements for custodial interrogations. 
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defendant in order to preserve a fair trial," e.g., the right of counsel, right to a speedy trial by 
jury, right of confrontation, right against double jeopardy, and right against compulsory self-
incrimination. Id. at 237-40,93 S.Ct. at 2052-55. In contrast, the "[t]he protections of the 
Fourth Amendment are of a wholly different order, and have nothing to do with promoting 
the fair ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial/9 Id. at 242,93 S.Ct. at 2055.2 The Court 
explained that "there is nothing constitutionally suspect in a person's voluntarily allowing 
a search." Id. at 242-43, 93 S.Ct. at 2056. "The actual conduct of the search may be 
precisely the same as if the police had obtained a warrant." Id. at 243,93 S.Ct. at 2056. The 
Court thus concluded that '"unlike those constitutional guarantees that protect a defendant at 
trial, // cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary 
relinquishment" Id (emphasis added). 
3. The Tenth Circuit Ignores Schneckloth: Untied States v. Abbott. 
Four years after Schneckloth, the Tenth Circuit once again applied the three-part 
standard pronounced in Villano: 
(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that consent was '"unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently" given; (2) the government must 
prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and 
(3) the courts indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that 
such rights were waived 
2The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment instead "protects the 'security of 
one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police.'" Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 
338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361 (1949)). 
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United States v. Abbott, 546 F.2d 883,885 (10th Cir. 1977) (citing Villano, 310 F.2d at 684). 
Abbott, however, did not consider the import of the Schneckloth decision. See Abbott, 546 
F.2d 883. 
4. The Utah Court of Appeals Adopts the Villano Standard. 
The Utah Court of Appeals first adopted the three-part Villano analysis, as articulated 
in Abbott, in two 1990 decisions: State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65,82 (Utah App. 1990), and State 
v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,887-88 (Utah App. 1990). Webb acknowledged Schneckloth, but 
only for the proposition that "[a] warrantless search conducted pursuant to a consent that is 
voluntary in fact does not violate the fourth amendment" Webb, 790 P.2d at 82. Marshall 
acknowledged Schneckloth's central holding: "'[T]he question [of] whether a consent to a 
search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, 
is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.'" Marshall, 
791 P.2d at 887 (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48) (brackets in 
original). Neither case, however, explored Schneckloth's impact on Villano's requirements 
that (1) the courts must "indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights." and (2) consent to search must be "intelligently given." 
See Villano, 310 F.2d at 684 (internal quotes omitted). 
5. The Tenth Circuit Renounces the Villano Standard: United States v. Price. 
Less than one year after the Utah Court of Appeals adopted the Villano standard, the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals renounced it in United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268 (10th 
Cir. 1991). The court observed that "[i]n subsequent consent search cases, [it] recited the 
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Villano test without explicitly considering the intervening Schneckloth holding that the 
presumption against waiver should not be transposed from the trial rights context to the 
consent search context." Price, 925 F.2d at 1271. On the other hand, the court noted, "every 
other circuit has followed Schneckloth by rejecting the waiver approach and employing the 
traditional 'totality of the circumstances' test" Id. While maintaining that "[t]he general 
inquiry outlined in Villano and its progeny remains relevant," the Tenth Circuit concluded 
that the "Villano test's application of the presumption against waiver [is] improper." Id. 
Thus, the court held, courts "should not presume a defendant's consent to a search is either 
involuntary or voluntary." Id. (internal citations omitted). Rather, "[t]he voluntariness of 
consent always must be determined from the totality of the circumstances." Id. 
6. The Utah Court of Appeals Persists In Applying Villano's "Presumption 
Against Waiver" Standard. 
Notwithstanding the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the Villano standard, the Utah Court 
of Appeals persists in applying it in the consent search context. Hansen is but the latest in 
a long line of decisions from the court of appeals that have applied Villano's waiver approach 
after it was abandoned by the Tenth Circuit See, e.g., State v. Sterger, 808 P.2d 122,127 
(Utah App. 1991); State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133,136 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Carter, 812 
P.2d 460,467 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037,1040 (Utah App. 1993), 
afd, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1996); State v. Genovesi, 871 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah App. 1994); 
Ham, 910 P.2d 433,439 (Utah App. 1996). While all of these cases reference the "totality 
of the circumstances" test, none address or otherwise attempt to reconcile the inherent 
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conflict between that test and Villano's "presumption against waiver"test. While the precise 
issue now before the Court was not raised in the cases leading up to and including Ham, the 
issue was squarely put before the court of appeals here. See Aple. Brf. at 8-25. Yet, the 
court of appeals did not even acknowledge the issue in its opinion below. See Hansen, 2000 
UT App 353, at fl 17-25. 
B. THE VILLANO "PRESUMPTION AGAINST WAIVER" STANDARD IS INCONSISTENT 
WITH SCHNECKLOTH AND SHOULD BE RENOUNCED. 
The court of appeals' application of Villano's "presumption against waiver" standard 
cannot be reconciled with Schneckloth. The court of appeals insists that it must "indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights," e.g., 
the right to be free from a warrantless search. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at ^ 25. In 
contrast, Schneckloth holds that "unlike those constitutional guarantees that protect a 
defendant at trial, it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged 
against voluntary relinquishment." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243,93 S.Ct. at 2056 (emphasis 
added). Similarly, the court of appeals insists that any consent must be "intelligently given," 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at 5 18, while Schneckloth holds that "knowledge of a right to 
refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent," Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234,93 S.Ct. 
at 2051. 
1. VUlano's "Presumption Against Waiver" Prong Is Contrary to 
Schneckloth. 
As referenced above, Villano's articulation of the three-part standard was taken from 
United States v. Page, 302 F.2d at 83-84. Page, in turn, quoted Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 
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458, 58 S.Ct. 1019 (1938), for the proposition that" * "[cjourts indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights."' Page, 302 F.2d at 84 
{quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023 (citations omitted)); see also Hansen, 
2000 UT App 353, at f 18 (holding that it "indulgefs] every reasonable presumption against 
the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights")- The petitioner in Schneckloth likewise 
urged the Supreme Court to adopt such a presumption in the consent search context, also 
relying on Johnson. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235,93 S.Ct. at 2051-52. The Supreme Court 
refused to extend Johnson to consent searches. The Court noted that the standard in Johnson 
was established "in the context of the safeguards of a fair criminal trial." Id. at 235,93 S.Ct. 
at 2052. In contrast, the Court observed, "[t]he protections of the Fourth Amendment are of 
a wholly different order, and have nothing whatever to do with promoting the fair 
ascertainment of truth at a criminal trial." Id. at 242,93 S.Ct. at 2055. The Supreme Court 
thus refused to adopt a presumption against waiver standard in the consent search context. 
Id. at 243, 93 S.Ct. at 2056. Schneckloth, therefore, compels abdication of the third prong 
of the Villano standard. 
2. Villano's First Prong Is Contrary to Schneckloth. 
The first prong of the Villano standard also transgresses the pronouncements in 
Schneckloth. That prong requires the State to demonstrate that the consent was "'freely and 
intelligently given.'" Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at 118. While Supreme Court precedent 
makes clear that any consent must be "freely" given, Schneckloth observed that its cases "do 
not reflect an uncritical demand for a knowing and intelligent waiver in every situation where 
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a person has failed to invoke a constitutional protection." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 235,93 
S.Ct. at 2052. Schneckloth noted that "[ajlmost without exception, the requirement of a 
knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution 
guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial." Id. at 237, 93 S.Ct. at 
2052-53.3 Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that "knowledge of a right to refuse is not 
a prerequisite of a voluntary consent [to search]." Id. at 234,93 S.Ct. at 2051. "[W]hile the 
subject's knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken into account, the prosecution 
is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary 
consent." Id. at 248-49,93 S.Ct. at 2059. 
The first prong also requires that testimony of consent be "clear and positive." 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at^ f 18. The requirement of clear and positive testimony simply 
employs Villano's presumption against waiver requirement At a suppression hearing, the 
State need only establish that a defendant voluntarily consented to a search by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233,236 (Utah 1985) (holding 
that "the accused's statements must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence to have 
been voluntarily made"); see also State v. James, 2000 UT 80, J 16,13 P.3d 576 (holding 
that to avoid suppression of evidence under the inevitable discovery rule, the State must 
"'establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately would have 
been discovered by lawful means'"). This Court has aptly summarized the burden as follows: 
3The requirement that any consent be "intelligently given" is no more than an 
adjunct to the presumption against waiver requirement. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 
235-48,93 S.Ct. at 2051-58. 
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A motion to suppress requests that a trial judge determine whether 
proffered evidence is constitutionally defective. In making such a ruling, a 
trial judge will often be called upon preliminarily to resolve factual disputes. 
If, after resolving the factual questions in his own mind, the judge concludes 
that the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant's constitutional rights will not be violated by admission of the 
evidence, it is admitted. On appeal, [the Court] will not disturb the trial 
court's resolution of the factual issues underlying its decision to grant or deny 
the motion to suppress absent clear error. 
State v. Bullock, 6999 P.2d 753,755 (Utah 1985). To the extent the requirement of "clear 
and positive" testimony requires something more, it is error. As held by the United States 
Supreme Court, "the controlling burden of proof at suppression hearings should impose no 
greater burden than proof by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Matlock, 
415 U.S. 164,177-78 n.14,94 S.Ct. 988,996 n.14 (1974); accord State v. Brown, 853 P.2d 
851,855 (Utah 1993) (citing Matlock for the proposition that the State bears the burden of 
proving common authority to consent to a search by a preponderance of the evidence). 
The first prong also requires that the consent be "unequivocal and specific." Hansen, 
2000 UT App 353, at^ f 18. This simply requires the State to make the threshold showing that 
consent was in fact given and that the search was within the scope of the consent. Thus, 
Villano 's specificity requirement is simply the expression of the principal that a consent 
search be limited to the scope of the consent given. See Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252,111 S.Ct. 
at 1804 (observing that "[a] suspect may of course delimit as he chooses the scope of the 
search to which he consents"). The court of appeals erred to the extent that it interpreted this 
requirement to mean something more. Cf. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at t l 21,26. 
* * * 
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In summary, a search is valid under the consent exception to the warrant requirement 
if the State meets a two-part test. First, the State must "prove that consent was given" and 
that the search was within the scope of that consent See Villano, 310 F.2d at 684. Second, 
the State must establish that the consent was voluntary. "[TJhe question whether a consent 
to a search was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." 
Schnecfdoth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-48 (emphasis added). That is the test 
sanctioned by our nation's highest court and this Court has consistently adhered to that test. 
See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 689 (Utah 1990); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1262-63 
(Utah 1993); State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196,1206 (Utah 1995). Indeed, the Court has not 
adopted Villano's waiver approach despite opportunity to do so. In State v. Harmon, 854 
P.2d 1037, 1040 (Utah App. 1993), the court of appeals applied the waiver analysis in 
upholding the trial court's conclusion that the defendant's consent to search her home was 
voluntary. Although this Court affirmed that decision, it did not employ the "presumption 
against waiver" standard, but applied Schnecfdoth's totality of the circumstances test. 
Harmon, 910 P.2d at 1206-08. It should now expressly renounce the Villano standard. 
C THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES ESTABLISHED THAT DEFENDANT 
VOLUNTARILY CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF HIS CAR. 
1. Defendant Consented to the Search of His Car. 
Implementing Villano's "presumption against waiver" standard, the court of appeals 
held that "Officer Huntington's testimony was neither clear nor positive regarding 
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[defendant's] response" to the officer's request to search the car. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, 
atf 20. The court of appeals' determination was incorrect See State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, 
f 9, 22 P.3d 1242 (holding that the Supreme Court reviews the decision of the court of 
appeals for correctness). 
(a) The Trial Court's Finding of Consent Is a Factual Determination 
Reviewed for Clear Error. 
Because the court of appeals appeared uncertain as to the appropriate standard of 
appellate review for the trial court's finding of consent, it is necessary first to clarify that 
standard.4 Whether consent was in fact given, and the scope of that consent, are underlying 
factual issues separate from the legal issue of voluntariness. This Court has observed that 
the correctness standard is applied to the voluntariness determination because "the concept 
of 'voluntariness' reflects a balance between the need for effective law enforcement and 
society's belief that the coercive powers of law enforcement must not be unfairly exercised." 
Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. The Court reasoned that in striking that balance, the appellate 
courts are in the best position to establish norms based on substantive policy fixing the limits 
of acceptable police behavior. Id. In this way, it will be less likely that "what constitutes 
unfairly coercive police behavior [will] not vary from courtroom to courtroom in Utah." Id. 
In contrast, the determinations of whether consent was in fact given and the scope of 
that consent do not involve any competing policy interests which must be balanced. They 
4After reviewing the suppression hearing testimony, the court of appeals held that 
the trial court's finding that defendant consented to the search was "incorrect." Hansen, 
2000 UT App 353, at f 21. The court then added that "to the extent [the trial court's] 
determination amounted to a finding of fact, it was clearly erroneous." Id. 
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are fact-sensitive issues only and the trial judge is in the best position to make those fact 
determinations. See id. As once observed by this Court, "[bjecause 'the truth is rarely pure 
and never simple,' the trial judge is in the best position to sift witness credibility and the 
accuracy of conflicting evidence." State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296,1299 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Arroyo, this Court reviewed a trial court's finding of consent for clear error. After 
observing that a trial court's rinding of fact may not be set aside "unless it is clearly 
erroneous," the Court concluded that the "prosecution's assertion [at the suppression hearing] 
that consent was given is not evidence and cannot support a finding of consent." Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 687. Thus, the Court held, "the trial court's finding of consent is clearly erroneous." 
Id. 
Clearly, the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether defendant actually 
consented to the search and the scope of that consent—determining what the defendant 
intended by his language or by his actions. For these reasons, this Court will not upset the 
trial court's factual findings in that regard unless they are clearly erroneous. Once those 
factual issues are addressed, the Court may then turn to the legal determination of whether 
the consent given was voluntary. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. 
(b) The Trial Court's Finding of Consent Was Not Clearly Erroneous. 
A trial court's finding of fact will only be reversed for clear error if "the evidence, 
including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings 
against an attack." State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474,475-76 (Utah 1990). "In other words, 
an appellant must show that the trial court's findings so lack support as to be 'against the 
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clear weight ofthe evidence/ thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'" State v. Gamblin,20QQ 
UT44,f 17n.2,1 P.3d 1108 (citations omitted). The court of appeals incorrectly concluded 
that the trial court erred in finding that defendant consented to the search. 
The record supports the trial court's finding of consent. The following exchange took 
place during the State's direct examination of Officer Huntington: 
Prosecutor And when you asked him for consent, do you recall now 
exactly how you phrased that? 
Officer It's my practice to ask them for consent by stating, Do you 
have any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle? And if 
they say no, I say, Well, do you mind if I check? 
Prosecutor Do you recall Mr. Hansen responding to your question? 
Officer He did give me consent 
Prosecutor Well first, with respect to the question as to whether he had 
those items in his car. 
Officer No. He said no. 
Prosecutor He said no. 
The Court And the query again, Officer, was, Do you have any— 
Officer Alcohol, drugs or weapons. 
Prosecutor To which Mr. Hansen said no? 
Officer That's correct 
Prosecutor And then you asked, [u]Do you mind if I check?[u] 
Officer Uh-huh. 
Prosecutor And what was his response to that question? 
Officer He said yes. 
Prosecutor Yes, he minded? 
Officer Yes, I could have consent to search. 
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R. 84: 17-18 (emphasis added). Accordingly, Officer Huntington twice verified that 
defendant consented to the search. He testified that when he asked if he could search the car, 
defendant "did give me consent." R. 84: 17. Although Officer Huntington subsequently 
appeared to testify that defendant gave a contradictory response when asked if defendant 
minded if he searched the car, Officer Huntington clarified that defendant responded, "Yes, 
I could have consent to search." R. 84: 18. 
On cross-examination, Officer Huntington again confirmed that defendant consented 
to the search: 
Def. Counsel So [after defendant said he did not have drugs, alcohol, or 
weapons in the car,] you then indicated that you asked him 
if you could search the vehicle? 
Officer I did 
Def. Counsel Do you recall specifically what you said to him? 
Officer Not specifically. 
Def. Counsel Do you have any idea? 
Officer I would imagine I stated: Do you have any alcohol, drugs 
or weapons in the vehicle? 
Def. Counsel He said no? 
Officer He said no. Do you mind if I check? 
Def. C<?un?d Okay. 
Officer And then he said yes. 
The Court He said? 
Def. Counsel He says yes. 
Officer Yes. 
The Court Do you mind if I check and he said yes? 
Officer Well, do you mind if I check, and then yes, he gave me 
consent Sorry. 
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Def. Counsel So you said he gave you consent? 
Officer Yes, he did give me consent. 
Def. Counsel What did he say? 
* * * 
Officer I don't recall exactly other than it was consent. 
Def. Counsel So you don't recall his exact words? 
Officer Not exactly. 
Def. Counsel So you are assuming that he said yes? 
Officer I assume that he said yes. 
Def. Counsel That's what you're doing today . . . in terms of his 
response? 
* * * 
Officer I assume that he said yes. 
n^f rnuns<>| Nothing more than that? 
Officer He probably could have said yes, go ahead. 
Def Co»nw! But you don't recall him saying that? 
Officer I don't recall. 
R. 84: 38-40 (emphasis added). Officer Huntington's testimony provided more than a 
sufficient basis for the trial court's finding that defendant consented to the search of his car. 
Common experience teaches that questions beginning with the words, "do you mind," are 
often answered in the affirmative even though the intent is to indicate that the speaker does 
not mind. The trial court, not the court of appeals, is in the best position to assess the 
meaning of defendant's response to Officer Huntington's inquiry. See Vigil, 815 P.2d at 
1299. As he did on direct, Officer Huntington twice testified that defendant consented to the 
search. All that defense counsel established on cross-examination was that Officer 
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Huntington did not recall "specifically" how he asked for consent and that he did not recall 
defendant's "exact* words. 
When asked on re-direct examination whether he "just [didn't] recall what the exact 
words were/' Officer Huntington testified that he did not. R. 84: 43. Otherwise, Officer 
Huntington was undaunted in his testimony that defendant consented Although Officer 
Huntington testified that he "assumed" defendant said yes, his assumption was to the 
wording only, not the consent. Thus, when defense counsel asked if the officer assumed 
nothing more than that defendant said yes, Officer Huntington testified that defendant 
"probably could have said yes, go ahead" R. 84: 40, 
In sum, Officer Huntington testified four times that defendant consented to his request 
to search the car. Although he did not recall the exact wording of the conversation, Officer 
Huntington was unequivocal in his testimony that consent was granted Moreover, defendant 
did not introduce any testimony, either from his himself or his passenger, to the contrary. See 
R. 84. As such, the evidence in support of the finding of consent was not so lacking "as to 
be 'against the clear weight of the evidence.'" Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, at f 17 n.2 (citations 
omitted). 
Notwithstanding the officer's unequivocal and uncontradicted testimony that 
defendant consented to the search of his car, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's 
finding of consent because the officer could not remember the conversation verbatim. See 
Hansen, 2000 UT App. 353, at 1120-21. The court observed that "Officer Huntington's 
responses to the [trial] court's questions were conclusory rather than 'clear and positive 
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testimony' that [defendant's] reply was '"unequivocal and specific.'"" Id. at^ f 21 (citations 
omitted). The court further emphasized that "Officer Huntington admitted that he did not 
recall [defendant's] exact words." Id. In employing the discredited "presumption against 
waiver" standard, the court of appeals imposed a burden on police and the prosecution which 
has never before been required and which is wholly unreasonable. 
The officer here frankly acknowledged that he did not recall the exact words of his 
conversation with defendant. R. 84:17,39. However, he testified that consistent with his 
normal practice, he asked defendant if he minded if he checked the car for drugs, alcohol, or 
weapons, to which the respondent said yes. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at f 20; R. 84:17-18. 
Realizing that the affirmative response to the officer's question could mean two different 
things, the judge asked, "Yes, he minded?," to which the officer testified, "Yes, I could have 
consent to search.'* Id. Three more times the officer testified that defendant gave his consent 
to the search, never expressing doubt as to the substance of the conversation. See R. 84:17-
18,38-40. 
As observed by the Massachusetts Appeals Court, '"[a] witness rarely can recite an 
oral conversation verbatim. All that in reason he can be asked to do is to give the substance 
of the talks."* Commonwealth v. Solomonsen, 735 N.E.2d 411,415 (Mass. App.) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Bonomi, 140 N.E.2d 140 (Mass. 1957)), review denied, 739 N.E.2d 701 
(Mass. 2000). Quoting Wigmore on Evidence, the Massachusetts court further noted: 
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"The general rule, universally accepted, is therefore that the substance or effect 
of the actual words spoken will suffice, the witness stating this substance as 
best he can from the impression left on his memory. He may give his 
'understanding' or 'impression' as to the net meaning of the words heard." 
Id. {quoting VII Wigmore, Evidence § 2097(a) (Chadboum rev. ed. 1978)). Indeed, no rule 
exists that requires the police to record interviews with suspects or to have complete memory 
of such interviews. Such a requirement would exact an unwarranted, if not prohibitive, 
burden on the police. Reason does not support such a requirement. See, e.g., Commonwealth 
v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 336,342 (Penn. 1998) (holding that finding of consent was supported 
by officer's testimony that although he did not recall the exact words, he remembered that 
defendant responded in the affirmative when he asked if she would mind if police searched 
her bag); State v. Moses, 517 S.E.2d 853, 869 (NC 1999) (upholding identification of 
defendant as murderer based on witness's memory that defendant told him he did it, though 
witness did not recall the exact words"), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1124,120 S.Ct. 951 (2000). 
The reversal of the consent finding also supplanted the trial court's traditional role and 
responsibility, based on its advantaged position, to judge credibility and resolve evidentiary 
conflicts. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. As discussed above, whether or not a defendant 
consented to a search is an underlying factual issue, rather than a legal one, which the trial 
court must resolve before even reaching the ultimate legal issue of voluntariness. As was 
evident from the exchange at trial, see Hansen, 2000 UT App. 353 at f20, the judge carefully 
examined the testimony, factoring in what could have been an ambiguous response to the 
officer' s request to search, and, based on the officer's further testimony, found that defendant 
27 
consented to the search. This is precisely what trial courts are best equipped to do and 
appellate courts are least able to do. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270. The court's novel 
requirement that the officer's testimony be clear and positive—or in other words, word for 
word—is founded in the "presumption against waiver" standard rejected in Schneckloth. 
2. Defendant's Consent Was Voluntary. 
Having determined that defendant consented to the search, the Court must determine 
if under all the circumstances, the consent to search was voluntary or the product of duress 
or coercion, express or implied. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227,93 S.Ct. at 2047-48. While 
the trial court's underlying consent finding is reviewed for clear error, its determination of 
voluntariness is reviewed by this Court for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,936-39 
(Utah 1994). A review of the facts here reveals that the trial court correctly concluded that 
the consent to search was voluntary. 
This Court has identified the following factors which may show the consent was 
voluntary, and not the product of duress or coercion: "1) the absence of a claim of authority 
to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere 
request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception 
or trick on the part of the officer.'* State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103,106 (Utah 1980). 
A review of those factors in this case supports the trial court's conclusion that the 
consent was in fact voluntary. Officer Huntington claimed no right to search, but simply 
asked for consent to search. R. 84: 16-18. There was no evidence that the officer used 
deception or trickery to obtain consent, making neither promises nor threats. R. 84:18. Nor 
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did Officer Huntington pull out or otherwise display his weapon- R. 84: 19. Although 
another officer had arrived at the scene, he remained standing next to Officer Huntington's 
patrol car, never approaching defendant R. 84: 14-16. Officer Huntington used the same 
tone of voice as he did in the courtroom at the suppression hearing. R. 84: 18. Moreover, 
defendant was cooperative during the entire encounter- R. 84: 46. Nothing suggests that 
defendant's consent was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied. To the 
contrary, the facts elicited at the suppression hearing demonstrate that the trial court correctly 
concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary- Accordingly, the trial court correctly 
determined that the consent was voluntary and the court of appeals decision should be 
reversed. 
The court of appeals held that '"because we indulge every reasonable presumption 
against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, we hold that the trial court erred in 
concluding that [defendant's] consent was freely and voluntarily given." Hansen, 2000 UT 
App 353, at f 25. As explained above, the courts application of the "presumption against 
waiver" standard was contrary to Schneckloth's totality of the circumstances test. Its decision 
cannot therefore stand 
Relying on State v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997), the court of appeals 
explained that **the intrusive and suspicious questions asked by the officer, combined with 
the fact that the questions were asked immediately after the defendant was detained, indicate 
that a reasonable person would not have felt free to go until they answered the additional 
questions." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at % 24. However, whether or not a person feels free 
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to leave, without more, has no bearing on whether the consent was voluntary. The issue of 
whether a person is free to leave pertains to detention, not consent. Detention alone cannot 
by itself render an otherwise voluntary consent involuntary. Otherwise, those under arrest 
could never consent to a search. See Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262 (holding that "the analysis 
used to determine voluntariness is the same without regard to whether the consent was 
obtained after illegal police conduct")-
* * * 
In summary, the trial court's finding that defendant consented to the search of his car 
was supported by the evidence. Moreover, under the totality of the circumstances, the 
evidence demonstrated that defendant's consent was voluntary. As such, the court of appeals 
erred in reversing the decision of the trial court finding voluntary consent. 
n. 
DEFENDANT'S CONSENT TO SEARCH HIS CAR WAS NOT 
OBTAINED BY POLICE EXPLOITATION OF A PRIOR ILLEGALITY 
Where, as here, a defendant's consent to search is voluntary, the Court must then 
determine whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality. See 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688. The court of appeals concluded that when Officer Huntington 
asked for defendant's consent to search the car, defendant was still subject to an investigatory 
detention for traffic violations. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at ff 13-16. As such, the court 
concluded, the questioning exceeded the scope of the stop and violated defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Id. atf 16. 
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A. STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW. 
The appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions, such as whether or not 
a person is seized under the Fourth Amendment, under a correctness standard, granting "a 
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of facts." 
Pena, 869 P.2d at 939 & n.4. Pena held that in evaluating a trial court's reasonable suspicion 
determination, "a sufficiently careful review is necessary to assure that the purposes of the 
reasonable-suspicion requirement are served" Id. at 939. Nevertheless, the Court did "not 
anticipate a close, de novo review." Id. 
A trial court's determination of the level of a particular citizen-police encounter 
should be subject to the same standard of review. Like reasonable suspicion determinations, 
seizure determinations "are highly fact dependent, and the fact patterns are quite variable." 
See id. at 940. Pena's reasoning for granting the trial court some discretion in its application 
of the reasonable suspicion standard applies with equal force in the seizure context: 
It would be impractical for an appellate court to review every reasonable-
suspicion determination de novo and then pronounce whether each unique 
factual setting rises to the level of reasonable suspicion as a matter of law. If 
[the Court] were to try, it is likely that the resulting case law would be 
confusing and inconsistent... On the other hand, we are not precluding this 
court or the court of appeals from effectively fencing off parts of the 
discretionary pasture from trial judges once the reviewing courts have enough 
experience with certain recurring fact patterns that the legal effect of those 
patterns can be settled with comfort. However, except in those situations in 
which appellate courts feel comfortable in developing the law in such a 
manner, trial courts should be permitted some rein to grapple with the 
multitude of fact patterns that may constitute a reasonable-suspicion 
determination. 
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Id. So too should trial courts be permitted some rein to grapple with the multitude of fact 
patterns that may define a seizure. 
Admittedly, whether or not defendant was still subject to an investigatory detention 
when Officer Huntington asked for permission to search his car is a very close case. 
However, if the "measure of discretion" accorded trial courts in applying the legal standard 
to the facts means anything, it must mean that in close cases, such as this, the reviewing court 
should respect the trial court's discretion. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE APPROPRIATE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT STANDARD TO THE FACTS IN DETERMINING THAT DEFENDANT'S 
CONSENT TO SEARCH CAME IN THE COURSE OF A CONSENSUAL ENCOUNTER. 
Traffic stops constitute a seizure subject to Fourth Amendment protection. Delaware 
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,653,99 S.Ct 1391,1396 (1979); accord State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 
1127,1131 (Utah 1994). However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all searches and 
seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,250,111 
S.Ct. 1801, 1803 (1991). The reasonableness of a traffic stop, like any other seizure, "is 
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate government interests." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 
(footnote omitted). 
Because "a traffic stop is limited and is more like an investigative detention than a 
custodial arrest," it must satisfy the two-part test established by the United States Supreme 
Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592,594 
(Utah App. 1992) (citations omitted); accord Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32. First, the stop 
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must be "'justified at its inception/" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1131-32 {quoting Terry, 392 U.S. 
at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). Second, the resulting detention must be '"reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the first place."1 Id. {quoting 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S.Ct. at 1879). "[OJnce the reasons for the initial stop of the 
vehicle have been completed, the occupants must be allowed to proceed on their way." State 
v.Lovegren,S29P.2d 155,158(UtahApp. 1992), "Further questioning is permissible only 
if (1) the encounter between the officer and the driver ceases to be a detention, but becomes 
consensual, and the driver voluntarily consents to additional questioning, or (2) during the 
traffic stop the officer gains a reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in 
illegal activity." United States v. Mendez, 118 F.3d 1426,1429-30 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). The State relies only on the first of the two options, 
conceding that the officer's additional questioning was not justified by additional reasonable 
suspicion. 
1. The Stop Was Justified at its Inception. 
A traffic stop is justified at its inception if it is '"incident to a traffic violation 
committed in the officers' presence.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 {quotingState v. Talbot, 792 
P.2d 489,491 (Utah App, 1990)). "Stopping a vehicle may also be justified when the officer 
has 'reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such as 
driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a license... [or that] the driver is 
engaged in more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs.'" Id. {quoting State 
v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040,1043 (Utah App. 1992)). 
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The court of appeals correctly concluded that "Officer Huntington was justified in 
seizing [defendant] because [defendant] committed two traffic violations in the officer's 
presence." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at f 10. Defendant conceded the legality of the 
initial stop on direct appeal. Id; see R. 84: 7, 10 (officer's testimony that he observed 
defendant make an improper left-hand turn and received information from his computer 
check that the car was not insured). Accordingly, the first part of the Terry test is not at issue 
on certiorari review. 
2. The Investigatory Detention Lasted No Longer than Necessary to 
Effectuate the Purpose of the Stop. 
"Once a [valid] traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop."* Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 
{quotingFlorida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,500,103 S.Ct. 1319,1325 (1983)). This Court has 
acknowledged that '"an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's 
license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,435 (Utah App. 1990)). So too may an officer run 
a warrants check during the course of a routine traffic stop, "so long as it does not 
significantly extend the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to request a 
driver's license and valid registration and to issue a citation." Id. at 1133. 
In this case, Officer Huntington notified defendant of the purpose of the stop, obtained 
defendant's registration and license, ran a computer check for warrants and to verify 
licensing and registration information, promptly returned to defendant's car after running the 
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computer check, warned defendant to get insurance, and gave back to defendant his driver's 
license and registration—all within a period of less than ten minutes. R. 66; R. 84: 13-14, 
16-17, 29, 35, 43-44. As the above-mentioned cases make clear, Officer Huntington's 
actions were reasonably related to the legitimate purpose of the stop and defendant did not 
argued otherwise. See Aplt Brf. at 20-21. 
3. Defendant's Consent to Search Was Given During the Course of a 
Consensual Encounter, after the Traffic Detention Ended. 
The trial court concluded that the return of defendant's documentation signaled the 
end of the detention—that "defendant was clearly free to leave" at that point. R. 66 
(Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, % 23). The court of appeals disagreed, holding 
that "neither the words of Officer Huntington nor the clear import of the circumstances 
would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was free to decline the 
officer's requests, terminate the encounter, and go about his or her business." Hansen, 2000 
UTApp353,atK13. 
Courts have recognized three levels of constitutionally permissible encounters 
between law enforcement and the public: (1) consensual encounters in which the person is 
free to leave, (2) brief investigatory stops based on articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime, and (3) arrests based on probable cause. State v. 
Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1997) (per curiam). The issue here, therefore, is 
whether Officer Huntington's return of the driver's license and registration converted the 
level-two detention of defendant into a level-one consensual encounter. 
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The Tenth Circuit has held that "'after an officer issues the citation and returns any 
materials provided, the driver is illegally detained only if the driver has objectively 
reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave.'" United States v. Anderson, 
114F.3d 1059,1064(10thCir. 1997){quoting UnitedStatesv. Shareef, 100F.3d 1491,1501 
(10th Cir. 1996)). The same rationale applies in the case of a warning. Once an officer gives 
a warning and returns any documentation provided by the driver, the driver is illegally 
detained only if the driver has objectively reasonable cause to believe that he or she is not 
free to leave.'" Id. {quoting Shareef, 100 F.3d at 1501). 
A level-two detention de-escalates to a level-one, consensual encounter if, "either 
from the words of [the] officer or from the clear import of the circumstances," a reasonable 
person would believe he or she is free to leave. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242,1244 (Utah 
1994). Factors that suggest a detention exists, or in the converse, that a detention has not 
ended, include "the threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon by an 
officer, some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone 
of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." United 
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,554,100 S.Ct. 1870,1877 (1980); Anderson, 114 F.3d 
at 1059. 
In this case, Officer Huntington had verbally warned defendant to obtain insurance 
and notify DMV. R. 84: 16-17, 35,43-44. He had also returned to defendant his driver's 
license and registration documents. R. 84: 16-17, 29. Defendant was not surrounded by 
officers. R. 67 (Findings, 167). Although a second officer arrived after Officer Huntington 
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had walked back to defendant's car, that officer simply parked along side Officer 
Huntington's car and waited for him there. R. 84: 14-15. He never approached defendant 
or his car, but stood next to the passenger door of Officer Huntington's patrol car. R. 84:15-
16. The third officer did not arrive at the scene until after defendant consented to a search. 
R. 84: 18-19. Although Officer Huntington was armed, he did not pull out his gun or 
otherwise display the weapon- R. 84: 19. Nor was there any evidence suggesting that he 
physically touched defendant or used any means of coercion. See R. 67 (Findings, f 32); R. 
84: 18-19. In short, Officer Huntington's verbal warning that defendant needed to obtain 
insurance and his return of defendant's registration and driver's license signaled the end of 
the detention such that a reasonable person would feel free to leave. 
The court of appeals noted that "Officer Huntington did not say anything to 
[defendant] that would have indicated that [defendant] was free to go." Hansen, 2000 UT 
App 353, at f 13. However, as also noted by the court of appeals, "an officer is not required 
to inform a detainee that they [sic] are free to go." Id. (citing Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 
38, 117 S.Ct. 417,421 (1996)). While so informing defendant may have added support to 
the trial court's determination that defendant was no longer detained, it is not necessary to 
reach that conclusion. 
The court of appeals also points to Officer Huntington's failure to indicate "how he 
intended to handle the improper lane change before he asked [defendant] if he had any 
alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the vehicle." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, atf 15. However, 
the Fourth Amendment does not require particular language, or words at all, to signal the end 
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of a detention. See Higgins, 884 P.2d at 1244. Indeed, any requirement that an officer 
expressly state that he is only issuing a warning or that he is not going to cite the offender 
would be contrary to the reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Ohio v. Robinette, 
519 U.S. 33,39-40,117 S.Ct. 417,421 (1996) (rejecting as unrealistic any requirement that 
police officers "always inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search 
may be deemed voluntary"). 
* * * 
In sum, Officer Huntington was not required to expressly inform defendant that he 
was issuing a verbal warning or that he was not citing defendant. The clear import of his. 
action in warning defendant to obtain insurance and in returning the documents was that 
defendant was free to leave. Contrary to the court of appeals' holding, Officer Huntington's 
question as to whether defendant had any drugs, alcohol, or weapons in the car, and his 
follow-up request for permission to search the car—which could not have taken more than 
a few seconds—did not extend the level two detention. Officers are free to pose questions 
to the public and a citizen's decision to answer the question does not escalate the encounter 
into a level two detention. See State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 1990) 
(holding that a seizure did not occur by virtue of the officer's request for identification), cert, 
denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). 
Moreover, nothing in the facts suggests that Officer Huntington used language or a 
tone of voice demonstrating that defendant was compelled to respond to his question or 
consent to a search. Officer Huntington used a normal tone of voice and did not make any 
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threats or promises. R. 84:18. As explained above, no show of force was made and the only 
other officer on the scene remained standing at Officer Huntington's patrol car. R. 84:14-
16,18-19. As such, the exchange was a consensual encounter in which defendant voluntarily 
chose to participate. The two brief questions did not extend the detention. The stop had 
ceased and defendant voluntarily consented to the questioning. Therefore, the evidence 
seized pursuant to the consent search was not tainted by a prior illegality. 
While this is admittedly a close case, the measure of discretion accorded the trial court 
in applying the standard to the facts compels affirmance of the trial court's determination that 
the encounter had de-escalated to a level-one encounter. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
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DAVIS, Judge: 
Hi Defendant Shayne Michael Hansen (Hansen) appeals his 
conviction for illegal possession of a controlled substance, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (1998) . 
BACKGROUND 
H2 On December 11, 1998, Officer Bruce Huntington of the 
Midvale City Police Department was driving behind Hansen. 
Officer Huntington initiated a computer check of Hansen's vehicle 
with the Utah Division of Motor Vehicles. While Officer 
Huntington waited for the results of the computer check, he 
observed Hansen make an improper left turn.1 After Officer 
Huntington observed the turn, the computer check revealed that 
Hansen's car was uninsured. Due to these violations, Officer 
1. Hansen completed his left turn by entering the right lane, 
rather than the extreme left-hand lane, presumably in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-66 (1998). 
Huntington decided to stop the vehicle, and he activated his 
overhead emergency lights. Hansen pulled off the road and 
stopped in the parking lot of a convenience store. Officer 
Huntington parked directly behind Hansen.2 
13 Officer Huntington, dressed in uniform and carrying a 
sidearm, exited his patrol car and confronted Hansen. Officer 
Huntington told Hansen that he stopped him because of the 
improper lane change and lack of insurance. Hansen admitted that 
he did not have any insurance and stated that he could not afford 
insurance. Officer Huntington requested Hansen's driver's 
license and registration, and returned to his patrol car to run a 
computer check on Hansen. After approximately five minutes, the 
computer check revealed that Hansen's license was valid, and 
Hansen did not have any outstanding warrants. Officer Huntington 
then exited his patrol car and returned to Hansen. While Officer 
Huntington was walking back to Hansen's vehicle, another officer 
pulled into the parking lot. This second officer parked next to 
Officer Huntington's car, got out of his patrol car, and remained 
by the patrol cars. The emergency lights on both patrol cars 
were flashing, and they remained flashing throughout the 
encounter. 
14 Upon returning to Hansen's vehicle, Officer Huntington told 
Hansen that state law required him to have automobile insurance, 
and Hansen needed to have an insurance agent mail proof of 
insurance to the Division of Motor Vehicles. Officer Huntington 
did not say anything to Hansen regarding the improper lane 
change. Officer Huntington then returned Hansen's driver's 
license and registration; however, Officer Huntington did not 
tell Hansen that he was free to leave. Instead, Officer 
Huntington asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs 
in his vehicle. Hansen replied that he did not have any such 
items. Officer Huntington then asked Hansen, "Do you mind if I 
check?"3 Officer Huntington testified that Hansen responded, 
"Yes."4 
2. It is not clear from the record whether Officer Huntington 
impeded Hansen's ability to drive off when he parked behind 
Hansen. 
3. Officer Huntington testified with commendable candor that "It 
is my practice to ask them for consent by stating, 'Do you have 
any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle?1 And if they say 
no, I say, 'Well do you mind if I check?'" 
4. The record indicates that Officer Huntington was unsure about 
Hansen's response. For example, during both direct and cross 
examination, Officer Huntington testified that Hansen responded 
(continued...) 
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15 Officer Huntington then told Hansen and his passenger to 
step out of the car, and Officer Huntington directed them to 
stand next to the other officer. Officer Huntington conducted a 
search of the car where he found a homemade billy club and a 
marijuana pipe on the floor of the driver's area of the car. 
Officer Huntington arrested Hansen and searched him incident to 
the arrest. During the search of Hansen, Officer Huntington 
found a substance he suspected to be methamphetamine. Hansen was 
later charged with possession of a controlled substance in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1998), and 
unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (1998). 
16 Prior to trial, Hansen moved to suppress evidence obtained 
in the searches, claiming that Officer Huntington illegally 
detained him and that he did not voluntarily consent to the 
search of his car. The trial court denied Hansen's motion to 
suppress, concluding that the evidence was lawfully seized 
because "[a] t the time consent was obtained, there was no seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes because defendant was free to 
leave," and "[d]efendant's consent to search was freely and 
voluntarily given." Hansen later entered a conditional guilty 
plea to unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Hansen 
now appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. 
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
H7 Hansen alleges that the trial court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress because Officer Huntington's search violated 
his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Specifically, Hansen argues that his consent to search 
was not valid because it was obtained through Officer 
Huntington's exploitation of an illegal seizure, and his consent 
was not voluntarily given.5 
4. (...continued) 
"yes" to the question "Do you mind if I check?" However, in both 
instances the court interjected by asking Officer Huntington if 
Hansen said "yes, he minded." Officer Huntington responded to 
the court's questions by stating that Hansen said "yes, I could 
have consent." However, Officer Huntington later admitted that 
he did not remember Hansen's exact response regarding his 
question--"Do you mind if I check?" 
5. In determining whether a defendant's consent to a search 
following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth 
Amendment, we look to: (i) the voluntariness of the consent, and 
(ii) whether the consent was obtained by police exploitation of 
(continued...) 
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[B]ecause the determination of whether an 
encounter with law enforcement officers 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth 
Amendment "'"calls for consistent application 
from one police encounter to the next, 
regardless of the particular individual's 
response to the actions of the police,w,w 
such determination is a legal conclusion that 
we review for correctness. 
Salt Lake Citv v. Rav. 2000 UT App 55,18, 998 P.2d 274 (citations 
omitted). Similarly, the trial court's ultimate conclusion that 
consent was voluntary or involuntary is reviewed for correctness. 
Sfift State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). However, 
"[T]he trial court's underlying factual findings will not be set 
aside unless they are found to be clearly erroneous." Id. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Nature of the police encounter 
18 Hansen argues that the trial court erred in its conclusion 
that, at the time the consent was obtained, there was no seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes because Hansen was free to leave. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution guarantees the "right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const, amend. 
IV. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that "stopping an automobile and detaining 
its occupants constitute[s] a seizure" within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, "even 
though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
the resulting detention quite brief." 
Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 653, 59 L. 
Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979). Thus, 
"[a]lthough a person has a lesser expectation 
of privacy in a car than in his or her home, 
one does not lose the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment while in an automobile." 
5. (...continued) 
the prior illegality. S££ State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 
(Utah 1993). Therefore, we begin our analysis with the issue of 
whether Officer Huntington's seizure was illegal and then analyze 
whether Hansen's consent was voluntary. 
QQnofl*7-rA d 
State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 
1989) (citation omitted). 
State v. Lonez. 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (alteration in 
original). 
19 "In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop, we consider 
two questions: '[W]hether the officer's action was justified at 
its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place.1" State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 65'5, 657 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (alteration in original) (quoting Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 
1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968)); accord Lopez, 873 P.2d at 
1131-32. With respect to the first question, a police officer is 
constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is 
"incident to a traffic violation committed in the officers' 
presence." State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990); 933 ftlgq State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 881-83 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) . 
110 Here, Hansen was seized by Officer Huntington when he was 
stopped for the improper lane change and lack of insurance. It 
is clear that Officer Huntington was justified in seizing Hansen 
because Hansen committed two traffic violations in the officer's 
presence. Consequently, Hansen does not dispute the legality of 
the initial stop and the first part of the Terry inquiry is not 
at issue. 
111 The second question in reviewing the legality of a traffic 
stop is whether the stop was reasonably related in scope to the 
traffic violation which justified it in the first place. See 
Patefield. 927 P.2d at 657. "Once a traffic stop is made, the 
detention fmust be temporary and last no longer than is necessary 
to effectuate the purpose of the stop.1" LQES£# 873 P.2d at 1132 
(quoting Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 103 S. Ct. 1319 (1983)). 
Both ,f[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly 
tied to and justified by1 the circumstances which rendered its 
initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 
(Utah 1991) (quoting Terry. 392 U.S. at 19-20). Therefore, 
[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic 
stop may request a driver's license and 
vehicle registration, conduct a computer 
check, and issue a citation. United States v. 
Guzman,864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988). 
However, once the driver has produced a valid 
license and evidence of entitlement to use 
the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed 
on his way, without being subject to further 
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delay by police for additional questioning." 
Id* 
State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
"Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal 
activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on 
specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." 
Lopez. 873 P.2d at 1132. 
1l2 Here, Hansen claims that he was illegally seized at the time 
the alleged consent was obtained because Officer Huntington 
engaged in investigative questioning without reasonable suspicion 
of more serious criminal activity. The State counters that when 
Officer Huntington gave Hansen a warning and returned his license 
and registration, the encounter between Officer Huntington and 
Hansen ceased to be a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 
1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968), and its 
progeny, there are three levels of 
police-citizen encounters, each requiring a 
different degree of justification under the 
Fourth Amendment. State v. Munsen. 821 P.2d 
13, 15 n.l (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied. 
843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). The first level 
occurs when an officer approaches and 
questions a suspect. An officer may stop and 
question a person at any time so long as that 
person "is not detained against his [or her] 
will." Id. The next level is reached when 
an officer temporarily seizes a person. In 
order to legally effect a temporary seizure, 
the officer must have "articulable suspicion" 
that the suspect has or is about to commit a 
crime, and the detention must be limited in 
scope. Id. The third level is arrest, which 
requires probable cause for the officer to 
believe that a crime has been or is about to 
be committed. Id. 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(alteration in original). The Supreme Court of Utah has 
declared: 
Not every encounter between a police officer 
and a citizen is a seizure. A person is 
seized under the Fourth Amendment when, 
considering the totality of the 
circumstances, the police conduct would have 
n an a o n /•** C 
communicated to a reasonable person that the 
person was not free to decline the officer's 
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter 
and go about his or her business. 
State v. Hiaains, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994) (internal 
citations omitted). 
Illustrating this standard, the United States 
Supreme Court noted: "Examples of 
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, 
even where the person did not attempt to 
leave, would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by 
an officer, some physical touching of the 
person of the citizen, or the use of language 
or tone of voice indicating that compliance 
with the officer's request might be 
compelled." 
State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 
(quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. 
Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980)). Furthermore, 
[o]nce a person is seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes, the seizure does not 
cease simply because the police formulate an 
uncommunicated intention that the seized 
person may go on his or her way. For the 
seizure to end, it must be clear to the 
seized person, either €r<?m the words of an 
pfficer or from the clear import gf the 
circumstances! that the person is at liberty 
tc go abcut his cr her business• 
Hiaains, 884 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added). 
1l3 In the present case, the trial court concluded that the 
detention did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop and that 
at the time Hansen consented to the search, there was no seizure 
for Fourth Amendment purposes. We disagree. The record clearly 
indicates that neither the words of Officer Huntington nor the 
clear import of the circumstances would have communicated to a 
reasonable person that the person was free to decline the 
officer's requests, terminate the encounter, and go about his or 
her business. Although Officer Huntington returned Hansen's 
driver's license and registration, given the surrounding 
circumstances, this act alone would not have communicated to a 
reasonable person that he or she was free to leave. See United 
States v. Sandoval. 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir. 1994) ("In the 
context of traffic stops this Circuit has adopted as an indicium 
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of a seizure the officer's taking of necessary documentation 
(driver's license and vehicle registration) from a driver, and we 
have also considered as a necessary (but not always sufficient) 
condition of the termination of that seizure the officer's return 
of such documentation . . . . " ) . For example, after Officer 
Huntington returned Hansen's license and registration, Officer 
Huntington did not say anything to Hansen that would have 
indicated that Hansen was free to go. We recognize that an 
officer is not required to inform a detainee that they are free 
to go, S££ Qhjg v. tofrinettg, 519 U.S. 33, 38, 117 S. Ct. 417, 
421 (1996); however, such a statement would have supported the 
trial court's conclusion that Hansen was not seized at the time 
he gave consent. See United States v. Torres-Guevara, 147 F.3d 
1261, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating defendant was not seized for 
Fourth Amendment purposes, in part, because officers told 
defendant she was free to leave); United States v. Gregory. 79 
F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Although not prerequisites, in 
determining whether consent is voluntary when given following the 
return of defendant's documents, we look at such factors as 
whether the officer informed the defendant that he was free to 
leave the scene or that he could refuse to give consent."); 
United States v. McSwain. 29 F.3d 558, 563 (10th Cir. 1994) 
(same). 
1l4 Not only did Officer Huntington fail to communicate to 
Hansen that he was free to leave, the question that Officer 
Huntington asked Hansen--"Do you have any drugs, alcohol or 
weapons in the car?"--communicated the message that Hansen was 
not free to leave. This question, although not directly 
accusatory, was clearly investigatory, indicating that Officer 
Huntington suspected that Hansen was engaged in some sort of 
illegal activity. Therefore, investigatory questions such as the 
one asked here actually cut against the proposition that a 
reasonable person would feel that the initial seizure has ended 
and that he or she is now free to terminate the encounter. Cf. 
Sandoval, 29 F.3d at 542 (stating that the crucial predicate to a 
voluntary police citizen encounter was missing because " [a]t no 
point did the nature of those inquiries [about defendant's drug 
involvement] change the climate so that the reasonable listener 
would view participation in the exchange as freely terminable"); 
Washington v. Soto-Garcia. 841 P.2d 1271, 1273-74 (Wash. 1992) 
(holding that progressive intrusion into defendants privacy was 
of such a nature that a reasonable person would not believe that 
he or she was free to end the encounter). 
<|15 In addition to Officer Huntington's words, the clear import 
of the circumstances in the present case would not have indicated 
to a reasonable person that he or she was free to leave. Officer 
Huntington remained at Hansen's vehicle and continued to ask 
Hansen questions, both Officer Huntington and a second armed 
officer's vehicles remained parked behind Hansen with their 
emergency lights flashing, and the second officer remained 
outside his vehicle throughout the encounter. Finally, Officer 
Huntington did not make any indication to Hansen as to how he 
intended to handle the improper lane change before he asked 
Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons, or drugs in the vehicle. 
Officer Huntington merely told Hansen to have his insurance agent 
call the Division of Motor Vehicles, and he returned Hansen's 
license and registration. Because of the clear import of the 
circumstances, especially the fact that Officer Huntington had 
not addressed one of the reasons for the initial stop, a 
reasonable person would not have felt free to terminate the 
encounter and proceed on his or her way. 
116 Due to the factors discussed above, we find that Hansen 
remained seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when, and because, 
Officer Huntington asked him whether there was alcohol, drugs, or 
weapons in the vehicle. Likewise Hansen was seized for Fourth 
Amendment purposes when Officer Huntington requested consent to 
search the car. The State concedes that Officer Huntington did 
not have a reasonable articulable suspicion of more serious 
criminal activity to justify the investigative questions. 
Therefore, Hansen was illegally detained when Officer Huntington 
asked him questions that were not reasonably related in scope to 
the traffic violation which justified the initial seizure. See 
United States v. Walker. 933 F.2d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(holding that defendant was unreasonably seized under Fourth 
Amendment when officer detained him to ask questions unrelated in 
scope to the reasons that justified the initial traffic stop). 
II. Voluntariness of Consent 
117 We now turn to the issue of whether Hansen's consent to 
search was valid despite the illegality of Officer Huntington's 
seizure. 
A warrantless search is a per se Fourth 
Amendment violation unless the State can 
establish one of the "'few specifically 
established and well-delineated exceptions.'" 
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 
1990) (quoting Katz v. United States. 389 
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S. Ct. 507, 514, 19 L. Ed. 
2d 576 (1967) (citations omitted)); accord 
State v. Sepulveda. 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 
App. 1992). One of the clearly established 
exceptions is a consent. Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 
687; Seoulveda. 842 P.2d at 918. 
State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
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118 "[A] defendant's consent to a search following illegal 
police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment only if both 
of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given 
voluntarily, and (ii) the consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality." State v. Thurman. 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993); see also State v. Arroyo 796 P.2d 
684, 688 (Utah 1990). "It is the State's burden to prove that a 
consent was voluntarily given. . . . If the State fails to meet 
this burden, the evidence is deemed inadmissible against the 
defendant." Ham, 910 P.2d at 439; accord Thurman, 846 P.2d at 
1263; State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
This court has adopted the following analytical framework to 
determine whether the State has met its burden of proving that 
consent was voluntarily given: 
1(1) There must be clear and positive 
testimony that the consent was "unequivocal 
and specific" and "freely and intelligently 
given"; (2) the government must prove consent 
was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these 
first two standards, we] indulge every 
reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights and there 
must be convincing evidence that such rights 
were waived.' 
Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (citations omitted) (alterations in 
original). In determining whether consent was voluntarily given 
we will look to the "totality of all the circumstances." 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte. 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 
2048 (1973); accord Ham# 910 P.2d at 439. 
119 As stated above, Hansen was illegally seized at the time 
Officer Huntington requested consent to search Hansen's vehicle. 
Therefore, for the evidence discovered in the search to be 
admissible, Hansen's consent, if given, must have been voluntary, 
and the consent must not have been obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality. The trial court concluded 
that Hansen's "consent to search was freely and voluntarily 
given."6 We disagree for the following reasons. 
120 First, Officer Huntington's testimony was neither clear nor 
positive regarding Hansen's response to his second question. See 
6. The trial court did not make any conclusion regarding the 
second factor--whether the consent was obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality--because the trial court 
concluded, erroneously, that there was no illegality preceding 
defendant's alleged consent to search. 
Hani/ 910 P.2d at 439 (requiring testimony that consent was 
unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given). 
Specifically, the following colloquies took place: 
Q. [Prosecutor] And then you asked, "Do you 
mind if I check?" 
A. [Officer Huntington] Uh-huh. 
Q. And what was his response to that 
question? 
A. He said yes. 
Q. [Court] Yes, he minded? 
A. Yes, I could have consent to search. 
Q. [Defense Counsel] Do you recall 
specifically what you said to him? 
A. Not specifically. 
Q. Do you have any idea? 
A. I would imagine that I stated: "Do you 
have any alcohol, drugs or weapons in the 
vehicle?" 
Q. He said no? 
A. He said no. Do you mind if I check? 
Q. Okay. 
A. And then he said yes. 
Q. [Court] He said? 
Q. [Defense Counsel] He says yes? 
A. [Officer Huntington] Yes. 
Q. [Court] Do you mind if I check--and he 
says yes? 
A. Well, do you mind if I check and then yes, 
he gave me consent. Sorry. 
. . . 
Q. [Defense Counsel] What did he say? 
A. What did he say? 
Q. Yeah. 
A. I don't recall exactly other than it was 
consent. 
Q. So you don't recall his exact words? 
A. Not exactly. 
121 Officer Huntington testified twice that he asked Hansen, "Do 
you mind if I check?" and Hansen responded, "Yes." The court 
clearly realized the import of Officer Huntington's testimony and 
interrupted the attorneys in an effort to clarify Officer 
Huntington's testimony. However, Officer Huntington's responses 
to the court's questions were conclusory rather than "clear and 
positive testimony" that Hansen's reply was "'unequivocal and 
specific.'" Ham, 910 P.2d at 439 (citations omitted). Moreover, 
Officer Huntington admitted that he did not recall Hansen's exact 
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words. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's determination 
that the testimony was clear and positive that Hansen's response 
was unequivocal and specific was incorrect. To the extent its 
determination amounted to a finding of fact, it was clearly 
erroneous. 
122 The Ham analytical framework requires us to next address 
whether Hansen's response was freely and intelligently given and 
obtained without duress or coercion, express or implied.7 See 
USUI 910 P.2d at 43. 
7. Our colleague suggests that our analysis should conclude with 
our ruling that the trial court incorrectly determined that the 
testimony was clear and positive that Hansen's response to the 
officer's second question was unequivocal and specific. 
While we may elect to forego further analysis in cases where 
one or more decided issues may arguably be dispositive, we are 
not obliged to do so. Indeed, there are numerous circumstances 
under which we may elect to reach an issue that arguably need not 
be addressed in order to resolve the case. Our election to treat 
moot issues which are of significant public import and likely 'to 
recur, even where the issue is not likely to evade judicial 
review, finds a particularly appropriate analog in this case. 
See, e.g.. In re S.L.. 1999 UT App 390,140, 995 P.2d 17 (reaching 
merits of issue capable of judicial review because it was of 
significant public import and was likely to recur) cert denied, 4 
P.3d 1239 (Utah 2000); W. & G. Co. v. Redevelopment Agency, 802 
P.2d 755, 765 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (addressing issue, even though 
other issue dispositive, because "it is of wide concern . . . it 
significantly affects the public interest, and it is likely to 
recur in a similar manner'1); QJLu State v. Rodriouez-Lopi. 954 
P.2d 1290, 1294 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Davis, J., concurring) 
(addressing issue because 'f[t]his situation is somewhat analogous 
to a determination of whether to reach a moot issue"). We may 
also analyze an issue to enable the supreme court to address that 
issue on review. Cf; State v. Macruire. 957 P.2d 598, 600 (Utah 
1998) (stating that issue was outside scope of review because 
court of appeals did not reach issue). We may also wish to 
provide guidance for further proceedings. See, e.g.. State v. 
James. 819 P.2d 781, 795 (Utah 1991) ("Issues that are fully 
briefed on appeal and are likely to be presented on remand should 
be addressed by [an appellate] court."); State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 
100, 108 (Utah 1988) (addressing issue in interest of judicial^ 
economy, since issue likely to recur, to provide trial court with 
guidance); Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'1 Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 231 
(Utah 1987)(same); Vitale v. Belmont Springs. 916 P.2d 359, 363 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996) (addressing issue in interest of judicial 
economy, even though case decided on other grounds). 
[T]he Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
require that a consent not be coerced, by 
explicit or implicit means, by implied threat 
or covert force. For, no matter how subtly 
the coercion was applied, the resulting 
"consent" would be no more than a pretext for 
the unjustified police intrusion against 
which the Fourth Amendment is directed. 
SchnscKloth, 412 u.s. at 228. 
In examining all the surrounding 
circumstances to determine if in fact the 
consent to search was coerced, a court must 
take into account both the details of police 
conduct and the characteristics of the 
accused, Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 684 [,] which 
include "subtly coercive police questions, as 
well as the possibly vulnerable subjective 
state of the person who consents." 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229, 93 S.Ct. at 
2049. 
State v; Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(emphasis added). 
123 The present case is quite similar to Ohio v. Robinette, 685 
N.E.2d 762 (Ohio 1997). In Robinette, an officer stopped the 
defendant for a speeding violation. See id. at 764. The officer 
issued the defendant a verbal warning for the speeding violation, 
and returned the defendant's driver's license. See id. The 
officer then said to the defendant, "One question before you get 
gone [sic] : are you carrying any illegal contraband in your car? 
Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?" Id. When 
defendant responded that he did not have any contraband in the 
car, the officer asked if he could search the vehicle. See id. 
The defendant answered "yes" to the officer's request. See id. 
On remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, see Ohio 
v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996), the Supreme 
Court of Ohio looked at the totality of the circumstances to 
determine whether a reasonable person would have believed that 
they could refuse to answer further questions and leave. See 
Robinette. 685 N.E. 2d at 769. The court then ruled that 
[the officer's] words did not give Robinette 
any indication that he was free to go, but 
rather implied just the opposite--that 
Robinette was not free to go until he 
answered [the officer's] additional 
questions. The timing of [the officer's] 
immediate transition from giving Robinette 
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the warning for speeding into questioning 
regarding contraband and the request to 
search is troubling. . . . "The transition 
between detention and a consentual [sic] 
exchange can be so seamless that the 
untrained eye may not notice that it has 
occurred. The undetectability of that 
transition may be used by police officers to 
coerce citizens into answering questions that 
they need not answer, or to allow a search of 
a vehicle that they are not legally obligated 
to allow." . . . When these factors are 
combined with a police officer's superior 
position of authority, any reasonable person 
would have felt compelled to submit to the 
officers questioning. 
Id. at 770-71 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). 
124 Here, as in Robinette. the intrusive and suspicious 
questions asked by the officer, combined with the fact that the 
questions were asked immediately after the defendant was 
detained, indicate that a reasonable person would not have felt 
free go until they answered the additional questions. 
Furthermore, although the questions were not expressly coercive, 
the circumstances surrounding the request to search made the 
request subtly coercive. Specifically, Officer Huntington had 
only issued a warning regarding the lack of insurance and he had 
not taken any action regarding the improper left turn. 
Therefore, a reasonable person would not have felt that their 
consent, if given, was a voluntary act of free will because 
Officer Huntington could have cited Hansen for the improper lane 
change if Hansen was uncooperative regarding the search. See 
Florida v. Royer. 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983) 
("[W]here the validity of a search rests on consent, the State 
has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained 
and that it was freely and voluntarily given . . . . ") (emphasis 
added). 
8. It is irrelevant that Hansen may have known that the search 
would have turned up contraband, thereby reducing the coercive 
nature of the situation (i.e., Hansen should have preferred the 
citation over the search) because the "'reasonable person1 test 
presupposes an innocent person." Florida v. Bostick, 510 U.S. 
429, 437, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991) (emphasis in original); 
accord Michigan v. Chesternut. 486 U.S. 567, 574, 108 S. Ct. 
1975, 1979-80 (1988) ("This 'reasonable person1 standard . . . 
ensures that the scope of Fourth Amendment protection does not 
vary with the state of mind of the particular individual being 
approached."). 
125 Officer Huntington did not provide clear and positive 
testimony that Hansen's alleged consent was unequivocal and 
specific. Furthermore, in looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, it is clear that Officer Huntington's request was 
coercive, and a reasonable person would not have felt free to 
ignore Officer Huntington's request. Therefore, because we 
indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of 
fundamental constitutional rights, see Ham, 910 P.2d at 439, we 
hold that the trial court erred in concluding that Hansen's 
consent was freely and voluntarily given.* 
CONCLUSION 
126 We conclude that the trial court erred in denying Hansen's 
motion to suppress the evidence obtained in the search of 
Hansen's car. Hansen was illegally detained when Officer 
Huntington asked for consent to search Hansen's vehicle. Officer 
Huntington did not provide clear and positive testimony that 
Hansen's alleged consent was unequivocal and specific and freely 
and intelligently given. In addition, the State did not prove 
that Hansen's alleged consent was given without duress or 
coercion. Consequently, Officer Huntington's search of Hansen's 
vehicle violated Hansen's rights under the Fourth Amendment and 
the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the 
evidence discovered in the search. 
127 Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with-this>ppinion. ^^ 
)rme, Judge 
9. Because we conclude that Hansen did not voluntarily consent 
to the search, we do not address whether the consent was obtained 
by police exploitation of the prior illegality. See Thurman. 846 
P.2d at 1262 ("If the court determines that the consent was not 
voluntary, no further analysis is required: the consent is 
invalid and the proffered evidence must be excluded.11). 
990987-CA 15 
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge (concurring in result): 
129 I agree with my colleagues that Hansen was illegally 
detained when the officer asked for permission to search his 
vehicle and conducted that search. I also agree that the trial 
court erred in determining that Hansen gave his clear and 
unequivocal consent to the search. Having made that 
determination, I would not undertake to analyze whether Hansen's 
non-consent was obtained without duress or coercion. I would 
therefore concur in the conclusion that the trial court erred in 
denying Hansen's motion to suppress. 
Pamela T. Greenwood," 
Presiding Judge 
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